挂上前置代理的墙内Tor用户点击墙内链接有多大概率可能暴露自己是Tor用户?
引用自:https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Warning#Confirmation_Attacks
The Tor design doesn’t try to protect against an attacker who can see or measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out of the Tor network. That’s because if you can see both flows, some simple statistics let you decide whether they match up.
That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination server itself) cooperate to attack you.
Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to learn whom to investigate, but Tor can’t protect against traffic confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing the math.
可能性1.(比如政府的类似本站一类的文本或图文之类的轻量网站/网页)一个网页没加载完就能立刻发现是谁在墙内通过Tor访问墙内网站?
可能性2.访问多次才能发现是谁在墙内用Tor访问?
可能性3.此方法仅限理论有效, 实际上不可能发现?
你觉得哪种可能性更高或者真实情况是什么?
从现实角度来看，网络罪犯被抓往往不是因为技术漏洞，可参考一些暗网市场站长的故事。与其纠结这些不重要的细节，不如把注意力放在更容易出错的部分：人
工具出错的概率很小，而人是最容易犯错的。各位可以自行回顾一下，自己在身份上犯了多少错误。
“网络罪犯被抓往往不是因为技术漏洞”前提和原因是因为网络罪犯通常都已经尽可能注视技术漏洞了, thphd就是一个不注视技术漏洞, 觉得只要自己不自我开盒就没事, 结果被抓的例子.
非特殊情况不建议使用任何前置代理进行Tor联网，webtunnel网桥的速度很快，超过多数免费代理软件。
多了一个前置代理，也就增加了复杂度，出错的概率也更高了。如果这个代理软件是中共蜜罐呢？如果代理软件的作者被捕，软件控制权落入中共手中呢？